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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic researchers have studied the Soviet economy from different perspectives and 
backgrounds. However, the early years of the Soviet Union lack a comparative analysis 
of its two representative growth strategies or periods, the New Economic Policy (1921 
– 1928) and the First Five Year Plan (1928 – 1932). Hence, this work focuses on the 
analysis of the sources of economic growth along with the functioning and organization 
of each growth strategy in order to identify the main differences between the New 
Economic Policy and the First Five Year Plan. In that sense, the analysis of the historical 
context and the treatment of data is initially developed in this study. Furthermore, the 
functioning and results of each growth strategy analysed in this thesis are presented and 
assessed in order to, finally, identify the differences between the early soviet growth 
strategies which are found in their functioning and results.  
 
 
 
   
Diversos economistes han estudiat l’economia de la Unió Soviètica des de diferents 
perspectives i contextos. Tot i això, els primers anys de la Unió Soviètica es caracteritzen 
per dos estratègies de creixement, les quals no s’han analitzat de forma comparativa, la 
New Economic Policy (1921 – 1928) i el First Five Year Plan (1928 - 1932). D’aquesta 
manera, aquest treball es centra en l’estudi de les diferents fonts de creixement 
econòmic igual que el funcionament i l’organització de cada estratègia de creixement 
econòmic per tal d’identificar les principals diferencies entre la New Economic Policy i el 
First Five Year Plan. Així doncs, l’anàlisi del context històric i el tractament de les dades 
s’expliquen al principi d’aquest treball. A més a més, el funcionament i els resultats de 
cada estratègia de creixement analitzada en aquest treball són presentats i valorats per 
tal de, finalment, identificar les diferencies de les diverses estratègies de creixement 
dels primers anys de la Unió Soviètica que es poden trobar tant en el seu funcionament 
com en els seus resultats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-words: Growth strategy, early years Soviet Union, industrialization, economic 
structure, economic organization, collectivization and investment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) transformed totally the way Russian 
society and economy was organized. The way resources were distributed, the goals of 
the economic policies among others are examples of the changes in those republics 
integrated in the USSR. This transformation, or at least a transformation of the society, 
has recently been claimed by several left wing sectors of western societies to be of great 
interest. Also, because the economic situation has worsened during the recent crisis, 
this idea of social transformation has reached higher levels of popularity, especially 
among those who suffered the most. Therefore, in this context of political and economic 
instability, the study of different socioeconomic systems to the one of western 
countries, capitalism, has become highly requested. Nonetheless, this work does not try 
to compare capitalism to different growth strategies under a socialist economy, but it 
analyses those strategies in order to identify its ins and outs.  
 
In addition, the USSR can be considered as an historical anomaly, as no other socialist 
economy of such dimensions has ever existed. Hence, the analysis of an economic and 
social transformation in such a country gains even more relevance as a possible 
alternative to capitalism. Nevertheless, the controversy regarding several economic 
analyses of the USSR and databases makes the study even of greater interest. 
Furthermore, it can be pointed out that the USSR, although having quite a constant 
economic policy along its existence, had initially two ways of conceiving economic 
growth. Those policies can be represented by the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the 
Five Year Plans. In that sense, the NEP involved a market economy system by which 
economic growth could be achieved whilst the Five Year Plans were based on a planned 
economy that controlled and assigned the rates of growth that each economic sector 
had to achieve. The analysis of those strategies may provide a little light in the different 
strategies of growth in an economic system such as the Soviet socialism. 
 
Consequently, the objective of this study is to distinguish the main differences regarding 
the method and results of the early soviet economic growth strategies (NEP and Five 
Year Plans). Regarding the study of the results, this work focuses on the analysis of the 
main sources that boosted national income growth (or not) and to which extent.  
Accordingly, the aim of this work is to corroborate (or not) the following statement: The 
NEP phase and the First Five Year Plan phase during the early economic development of 
the Soviet Union presented totally different views of economic growth in a socialist 
economy. All in all, this study incorporates a general analysis and comparison of both 
growth strategies which can be considered as a novelty, since no author has ever 
compared the results nor the functioning of the NEP period with the First Five Year Plan. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this work, as has been presented in the introduction, is to distinguish the 
main differences regarding the method and results of the early soviet economic growth 
strategies (NEP and Five Year Plans). Nonetheless, the previous resolution can be 
achieved in a wide variety of ways. In that sense, this work presents a methodology 
based essentially in a dual assessment and analysis of the two growth strategies that will 
be compared. 
First of all, in order to have a wide perspective of how each economic system worked, a 
descriptive analysis of the economic structure and functioning is presented. In fact, this 
description enables further analysis and assessments to differentiate theoretically and 
structurally the NEP from the First Five Year Plan. 
Additionally, providing a practical view of each growth strategy, this work presents an 
assessment of their economic results. Furthermore, the analysis and assessment of the 
results of each growth strategy are based on the evolution of national income data. A 
part from the evolution of national income, the weight of each economic sector in the 
national income is also analysed. Therefore, the analysis and assessment of each growth 
strategy results is done through the study of the national income in each period. 
The reasoning for this type of analysis is the following: Firstly, it has been considered 
that data on national income represents the main factor in order to analyse the results 
of a growth strategy. Secondly, national income embraces all economic sectors and its 
analysis can lead to further study of each economic sector to provide a deeper analysis 
of the economic situation in the period analysed. Finally, the study of further economic 
aspects, for instance income distribution, presents two problems that might be 
unsolvable: Some data on certain economic aspects is only available in Russian or even 
is not available. Moreover, to introduce a complete and rigorous analysis of other 
economic aspects would lead to an extremely extensive work. 
Finally, it is important to underline the fact that this work focuses exclusively in the 
analysis of the First Five Year Plan (1928 - 1932) and that is the case for several reasons: 
First of all, it was the first plan and so, it was successive to the NEP period, hence, 
minimum contextual and temporal distortion is expected when comparing both 
systems. Furthermore, the First Five Year Plan introduced a total change in the economic 
organization and functioning of the USSR (as well as the introduction of the New 
Economic Plan). 
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III. CONTEXT 
 
3.1 Statistics in the USSR 
 
The veracity of statistical analysis and databases provided by the USSR official 
institutions, especially during the Stalin era, has usually been questioned by western 
scholars. Moreover, those credibility issues that some data related with the Soviet Union 
have are not just due to a presumable lack of independency between the statistical 
institutions and the government itself, but also due to the way some data were 
measured in the USSR. In this context, this work does not aim to determine which 
databases were manipulated or not (as this would be totally out-of-scope for this 
document). Furthermore, according to Harrison, M. (1999) “Instead of searching for lies, 
Western scholars looked for a mechanism of distortion, i.e., a methodology that would lead to 
exaggerated real growth estimates without any deliberate intention or special instruction to lie.”. Hence, 
this work is going to focus its statistical treatment exclusively in the possible 
methodological biases that could have been generated.  
Finally, the aim of this section is to define how the statistical databases were made in 
the USSR and which effects or elements can distort (or not) the data, in order to correctly 
understand the statistics of the Soviet Union used along this work.  
 
3.1.1 The Material Product System (MPS) and the Greschenkron effect 
 
In order to define the national income, a different concept to the standardized GDP for 
western countries was used. The Material Product System (MPS) was not only used in 
the USSR, but it was also used in other socialist countries like China. In this sense, the 
MPS used the Net Material Product (NMP) to define the national income. The NMP was 
measured through the value of final output of material goods (but not services, although 
some, as transport, were included in the NMP computations), net of depreciation, 
valued at transfer prices which included indirect taxes. This kind of measurement does 
not really present an unsolvable problem if a conversion to western GDP is aimed as 
Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) suggest “[…] here is a technical 
difficulty at most, relatively easy to overcome, and not a source of major distortion or bias”. Therefore, 
data measured in GDP form the Soviet Union should not, in itself, be a source of 
worrisome regarding its accuracy. 
Nonetheless, more important problems arise when indexed data is used. In the case of 
the period between 1920’s and 1930’s, it is of great importance the fact that Soviet 
series were calculated in terms of the initial-year prices of the economic year 1926/27. 
In this sense, it is generated an effect in the measurement of the data known as the 
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Gerschenkron effect. This effect is described as the gap generated between the rates of 
growth that come out of measuring the NMP indexed in initial-year prices and the NMP 
indexed in late-year prices (which can be, according to W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, 
S. G. (1994) from 1937 onwards).  
In this sense, imagine a production index as the following: 𝑂𝑖 =
∑𝑃𝑖·𝑄𝑓
∑𝑃𝑖·𝑄𝑖
, where Pi is the 
price of each product at early-year, and consider a country with an industrialization 
process (economic structural change) going on during the period. In such a case, 
attention must be taken in the evolution industrial goods. At the beginning of the period, 
those goods have a high price (as they are scarce) (high Pi). Hence, a production index in 
early-year prices (Pi) will show an overrepresentation of industrial goods in total output, 
generating some distortion in the measure of growth (in this case, growth would be 
inflated). 
Therefore, in the use of output data, how it is indexed (if it is) should be taken into 
consideration in order to evaluate correctly the real growth that the data shows. 
 
3.1.2 Hidden inflation 
 
Finally, the analysis of early soviet statistics can present other biases, like the hidden 
inflation effect. This phenomenon may appear in national income due to the 
introduction of new products that were counted in the national income with a price for 
the year at which the series was indexed. Thus, according to Harrison, M. (1999) “In the 
early years, new products were given plan prices on the basis of either “the price relating to the initial 
moment of mass production of the given type of product, or the average for the first three months of its 
manufacture” (Rotshtein, 1936, p. 241).”. Following this argument, it can be said that new 
products were usually valued at a high price (as the prices in what can be called 
prototype production period are high).  
Nonetheless, hidden inflation may appear to be more important the year after 1928, by 
which product innovation widespread in Soviet industry. Therefore, the impact that 
hidden inflation may have in the early 20’s data (during the period of the New Economic 
Plan (NEP)) can be considered to be minor to the one generated in the First Five Year 
Plan period. 
 
3.2  The Tsarist Russia: The fall of the Romanov 
 
The Tsarist economy was what the former USSR inherited. Therefore, in order to 
establish an objective starting point for the analysis, it is of incalculable necessity to start 
the economic analysis of the industrialization of the USSR revealing the ins and outs of 
the Tsarist economic system and structure. Nonetheless, it must be said that Russia 
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suffered from a Civil War (1917 – 1922) which also influenced the initial years of the 
USSR and that will further be analysed. 
 
3.2.1 Economic structure 
 
It is widely accepted by the scholars that, the Tsarist economy was always an agrarian 
economy, even at the final years of the Tsarist leadership. For instance, according to 
Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) “The Tsarist economy on the eve of the 
First World War was still primarily an agrarian peasant economy. Agriculture was responsible for over half 
the national income, and three-quarters of all employment”. Supporting the previous assessment, 
the following table presents the national income of the Russian Economy in 1885 and 
1913 is decomposed in its different components. 
Structure of the Russian economy, 1885 and 1913 (value added in 1913 prices) 
Figure 3.1. Source: Allen, R. C. (2003). Farm to factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet 
industrial revolution. Princeton University Press 
Despite having an increasing trend on the weight of the national income, industry was 
far from the overwhelming contribution of the agricultural sector on the national 
income. Moreover, the relative increase on the total weight of the industrial sector over 
the Russian economy was merely symbolic and far from representing any structural 
change in it, since agriculture continued to represent, in 1913, more than 50% of the 
output produced in Russia1. 
Nonetheless, it must be said that industry (Light and Heavy) experienced a tendency to 
increase, even though this increase may not be considered a structural change in the 
economy, in 28 years its weight in the economy went from 6,6% to 14,9%. This increase 
in industrial value added was basically due to state promotion, tariffs and market 
                                                          
1 For an international comparison on the levels of industrialization, look at Table 8.1. 
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integration that enabled industry to develop. In this regard, the tsarist state 
implemented tariffs in order to protect Russian production from the world integration 
provoked by the globalization process that was taking place during the 19th Century 
shaped by Imperialism2. Moreover, the integration of the domestic market provided by 
the railroad building provoked an increase in the domestic demand leading to a rise in 
prices of both, the agricultural and the industrial sector. This final statement is clarified 
in the following figure: 
Agriculture and Industrial Prices between 1890 and 1913 
Figure 3.2. Source: Allen, R. C. (2003). Farm to factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet 
industrial revolution. Princeton University Press. 
Therefore, it can be said that even though some progress was made at the late years of 
the Tsarist regime, the Russian economy had an agrarian economic structure much 
closer to an underdeveloped country than a European one or an offshoot. 
 
3.2.2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) evolution 
 
Regarding the national income levels in the pre-soviet Russia, some clarifications can be 
made considering the economic structure analysed in the previous chapter. Individually, 
Russian GDP pc increased smoothly, showing the domestic market integration that 
boosted the domestic demand which, combined with the tariff policy, generated a 
situation in which Russian productive sectors may have fulfilled the demand generated 
                                                          
2 Wars like the opium wars (1839 - 1842) and (1856 - 1860) as well as the British conquest of India (ending in 1857) 
among others lead to a major openness of the world to European markets and so, a process of globalization. 
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by this domestic market integration. However, according to Carstensen and Guroff 
(1983) “Russia was not so much demand-constrained and therefore in need of a substitute market as it 
was constrained by institutions and policies”. In this sense, it might be considered that the 
growth generated in the latest years of the Tsarist regime might not have been sustained 
in the long run because of “uncertainty in the property rights and limited access to capital, markets, 
and skills”. Nonetheless, economic growth was achieved, as is shown in the following 
figure: 
GDP pc in Russia (1885 to 1913) 
 
Figure 3.3. Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version. 
GDP pc in Russia went from 865 1900 Int. GK$3 in 1885 to 1.414 in 1913. This data means 
that along this period, Russia grew at a mean of 2,06%, which is slightly better than 
countries like USA (1,87%), France (1,70%), Germany (1,81%) and Argentina (1,94%) but 
worse than Canada (2,85%) or Peru (2,18%). Hence, it can be said that Russian economic 
performance between the end of the 18th Century and the 19th Century (until de 1st 
World War) embarked this country into a process of convergence with the developed 
world (Western Europe and Offshoots). Nevertheless, if the Russian GDP per capita 
between 1885 and 1913 is compared to that of the Western Europe and the Offshoots, 
the difference is overwhelming Figure 8.1. For instance, the USA GDP per capita at 1913 
was 374,88% of the Russian one, the German was 258% and it is not until Russia is 
compared with the poorest countries in Latin America (Venezuela 78,07% and Peru 
73,01%) or the richest ones in Asia (Japanese GDP per capita was 98,07% of the Russian 
one) when we find similar GDP’s per capita. 
                                                          
3 1900 International GK$ is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power parity than the US 
dollar in 1900. 
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Thus, even though a certain process of convergence with the developed countries 
happened in Russia from 1885 to 1913, this process was very poor and did not allowed 
Russia to catch up with the developed country category regarding the GDP per capita. 
 
3.3 The Russian Civil War (1917 – 1921): A brief contextualization 
 
The Bolsheviks seized power on 7 November 1917, nonetheless, from 1918 to 1921 it 
was introduced to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) what has 
been called “War Communism”. This idea or policies were applied during the period of 
Civil War in Russia resulting in an economy in tatters at the end of the period, according 
to Allen, R. C. (2003). 
 
3.3.1 War Communism 
 
During the period of War Communism (1918 – 1921), business and factories were 
nationalized, the hiring of labour was forbidden and the market was declared illegal. 
According to some Western scholars, the measures taking place during the War 
Communism were temporary. In that sense, it has been considered that most of the 
actions made during War Communism were a direct consequence of the emergency of 
war. Nonetheless, it has also been pointed out that policies taking place in War 
Communism had Marxian bases and were rather the delivered aim of the revolution4. 
Nevertheless, to understand the War Communism period and its consequences, it must 
be first analysed what was made during the period. In that sense, while the peasants 
had been seizing the property of townsmen, nobles and church since the spring of 1917, 
the first measure during War Communism was to nationalize all land and transfer it to 
the peasantry. Although this measure equalized land property, in the desperate 
conditions of the time, incentives to sow lowered as well as peasant sales of grain. Thus, 
the agricultural economy of the country was essentially reduced to self-subsistence and 
war porpoises (since a system of surplus confiscation was stablished in order to finance 
those porpoises). All this, lead to a production of grain that was just 44% of its level in 
1913 according to Allen, R. C. (2003). 
Regarding the urban economy, industry almost disappeared during this period, as by 
1920, industrial production was only 20% of the pre-war volume. This phenomenon may 
be considered to have happened due to different factors: First of all, there was a 
shortage of materials that were essentially imported all along the War Communism 
period. Moreover, there was also a shortage of those products that were normally not 
                                                          
4 See Roberts, P. C. (1970). 
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imported, either because they were devoted to war efforts or because they were 
controlled by the White Army. Secondly, as Richman, S. L. (1981) suggests “With industrial 
production at a near standstill, the towns had little to trade for the peasants for food […]” and that lead 
to the already mentioned lowering of the incentives for the peasantry to obtain 
surpluses and also to a redistribution of the population.  
Therefore, after the Civil War and the War Communism, the Russian SFSR economy 
suffered an important amount of negative factors that ended up reducing the total 
output of the economy, as Figure 3.4. shows: 
Evolution of the GDP per capita during the War Communism period (1917 – 1922) 
 
Figure 3.4. Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version. 
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IV. THE NEW ECONOMIC PLAN (1921 – 1928) 
 
The New Economic Plan (NEP) was an economic growth strategy applied in the Soviet 
Union during the 1920’s (1921 – 1928). Therefore, the NEP can be defined as Fitzpatrick, 
S., Rabinowitch, A., & Stites, R. (1991) do: 
“[…] the period between the end of the Civil War and onslaught of collectivization and rapid 
industrialization in late 1929 is known as NEP because of a series of new economic policies introduced by 
the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1921. These had to do first and foremost with ending food requisitions 
from countryside and eliminating tight restrictions on private trade and production”.  
The starting point of the NEP, or historical background, was the end of the Russian Civil 
War (1917 – 1921) that resulted in an almost complete destruction of the Russian SFSR 
economy, as has been analysed in the previous chapter.  
As Allen, R. C. (2003) points out “Lenin introduced the NEP to reverse this situation [after-war 
economic situation] as well as to appease the peasants. In many ways, the NEP reflected a retreat 
from the extreme measures of war communism”. In that sense, the New Economic Plan aimed 
to restore economic growth in the Russian SFSR. Nonetheless, it was a controversial 
measure especially among Bolsheviks, who saw those policies as a drift to capitalism of 
the country. 
As for the NEP, the study and assessment of this economic strategy would be the core 
of the analysis made in this chapter. Essentially, the analysis presented is structured in 
3 sections: Firstly, it is identified which were the motivations for a change in the soviet 
economic policy and which factors influenced in those motivations. Secondly, a 
theoretical description of the structure and functioning of the New Economic Plan is 
made. In this regard, the economic structure of the Soviet economy in that period is 
analysed, in order to identify it as a market or socialist economy (or a mixture of both). 
Finally, an assessment of the economic results obtained under the NEP and so, an 
identification of which aspects of the results can be attributable to one or another 
aspect of the economic strategy.  
 
4.1 Motivations for a policy change 
 
4.1.1 Trouble with the peasantry 
 
War Communism and the Civil War itself let the peasantry at the edge of rebellion. There 
are several reasons that explain that situation. First of all, it must be pointed out that 
the peasantry had its surplus production seized during the War Communism period, as 
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it has been remarked previously in this work. In that sense, the peasants organized 
themselves in order to reverse the confiscations of their surplus and several revolts 
against the Bolshevik’s policies took place (like the Tambov Revolt (1920 – 1921)). 
Although those revolts ended, generally thanks to the intervention of the Red Army 
rather than a negotiation process, they were a clear sign of the unrest and delicate 
situation of the peasantry. Taking those events in mind, it must also be considered that 
during 1921 there was a drought that struck the country resulting in a famine.  
Therefore, during the Party Congress on March 8th of 1921, Lenin proposed a change in 
the policy regarding the requisition of peasant’s surplus. In Lenin’s words “[referring to 
the policy change] Its essence lies in the relations between the workers and the peasants. The interests 
of these classes do not coincide: the small farmer does not desire what the worker is striving for. 
Nevertheless, only by coming to an agreement with the peasants can we save the socialist revolution”. 
Lenin, V. (1921).  
 
4.1.2 The trade unions debate 
 
Apart from the peasantry, the recently formed socialist state had to deal with another 
remarkable issue, the role of the trade unions in a socialist state. The scope of this 
debate is connected to the necessity of policy changes as far as it refers to the level of 
centralization and bureaucracy in the administration of industry. 
From 1920 to 1921, this debate on the role of trade unions in a socialist state took place. 
There were up to three different positions in this debate, according to Dobb, M. (1946): 
Trotsky’s position was that trade unions had to become brigades in the labour army, 
with officers subject to appointment and removal from the state. These measures would 
give the almost absolute control of trade unions to the state. In this sense, Trotsky 
proposed a highly centralized administration of the trade unions in order to promote 
industrial efficiency. Nonetheless, a completely opposed view to the previous was the 
one held by the trade union leader Mikhail Tomsky. Tomsky considered that trade 
unions had to virtually advocate the handing over of industrial administration. Hence, 
Tomsky’s view consisted essentially on independent trade unions.  
Another relevant opinion was the one defended by Lenin, who advocated that trade 
unions, while maintaining their independent position, should undertake greater 
responsibilities in organizing labour to solve production problems. 
Finally, Lenin’s proposal was approved, leading to a more decentralized administration 
of worker’s in industry. Furthermore, this decentralization would lead, as will be 
analysed later on, a generalized phenomenon during the NEP period. 
 
 15 
 
4.2 Structure and functioning of the NEP 
 
4.2.1 Market dynamics in the Soviet economy 
 
During the New Economic Policy period, several novelties were introduced in the way 
the economy functioned. 
Accordingly, economic transactions between the industrial sector and agriculture 
changed substantially and requisition of peasant’s surplus was substituted by a tax in 
kind. Moreover, the tax was assessed as a proportion of the net production above the 
minimum subsistence needs of each family. Thus, substituting the War Communism 
system of surplus confiscation by a tax in kind had several consequences in the 
functioning of the economy. Firstly, the introduction of a tax in kind allowed the 
peasantry to start trading with their remaining surplus. In that sense, market 
mechanisms were introduced in the Soviet economy in the vital economic relations 
between cities and countryside as the agricultural sector supplied all kind of primary 
products needed by the industrial sector and also supplied food for the cities. 
Furthermore, the end of the surplus confiscations lead to a decentralization of the 
supply of materials and foodstuffs as apart from the control over the state farms and 
some state enterprises, the State had no direct control over the transactions between 
the peasantry and urban areas. Finally, since market mechanisms were introduced in 
the economic relations between industry and agriculture, firms had two ways to be 
supplied: Through the open market or through the state. However, the way firms 
supplied was not complementary; either a firm was supplied through the market or 
through the state. This fact presents a dual economic structure, from one side there was 
a market operating more or less freely5 and a state controlled economic system. 
Regarding the industrial sector and market dynamics, the introduction of the NEP 
supposed some changes. The system that organized the management of industry during 
the war communism was eliminated and industry reorganized as Dobb, M. (1946) 
remarks “[…] industry was grouped into financially autonomous units, which (with certain exceptions, 
including the major part of heavy industry) were “removed from the state budget” and transferred to 
“commercial basis””. In that sense, trusts were formed and the management of those was 
far more decentralized and based on a commercial basis. Moreover, those trusts traded 
freely their production in the market (except those producing in strategic sectors6 ). 
Trusts and production organization will be analysed with more depth later on.  
Considering the foreign trade, it can be said that after the war it was restored, and with 
it, the need to introduce a new system for that kind of trade. Since market mechanisms 
were introduced, as has been explained in this section, within the Soviet government 
                                                          
5 Look at pages 15, 16 and 18 of this document. 
6 See pages 15 and 16. 
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there was an important debate regarding the optimality of a foreign trade monopoly. 
However, as Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) comment “[…] while 
trade remained fully under state control, the power to engage in foreign trade was delegated to a number 
of other state and cooperative bodies and some joint ventures were established for this purpose”. 
Essentially, trade management was done through direct control over the trade flow and 
currency exchange. Moreover, regarding imports and exports, policy makers recognised 
necessity to attract foreign industry in order to obtain technology from abroad. 
Nonetheless, this attraction of foreign industry (through concessions) was not successful 
as western firms did not want to make long-term investments in the Soviet Union as 
Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) outline. 
However, markets were in some cases under price controls established by the Price 
Committee under the Commissariat of Finance, basically after the hyperinflation 
experienced during the first years of the NEP and which will be analysed later on this 
work. 
In conclusion, the introduction of the NEP provoked important changes in the economic 
system of the Russian SFSR and lately of the USSR. Those changes consisted in the 
introduction of market mechanisms in the economy (such as the free trade of 
agricultural surplus and the introduction of open market in industry). Nonetheless, 
although complete free market was achieved in some cases, State control (regarding 
prices and supply) was still stablished in some sectors. 
 
4.2.2 Economic organization 
 
Regarding the organization of the industrial sector, during the second half of the 1921 
and the 1922, trusts were created. Trusts could be defined as financially autonomous 
units that were managed on the basis of commercial principles. Those were part of the 
introduction of market mechanisms commented in the previous section. 
In fact, as Dobb, M. (1946) outlines “By a decree of October 27th, 1921, enterprises were divided 
into two classes: those still dependant on centralised State supplies and those endowed with complete 
financial and commercial independence”. Therefore, not all enterprises during the NEP were 
managed by the government itself (or through Vesenkha’s departments). Nonetheless, 
a decree from February 6th, 1922, established that some enterprises’ production of 
several strategic sectors could not be placed on market circulation, as the greatest part 
of that production had to be delivered to the State.  
Among those strategic sectors we can find certain metal industries, war industry, 
locomotive and the railway’s industry. Furthermore, those sectors were managed 
similarly to how enterprises were during the War Communism, as Vesenkha’s 
departments were responsible for the administration of those strategic sectors.  
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Nonetheless, once the USSR was formed (December 1922), trusts were classified in 
three different categories based on to whom each trust was subordinated (Vesenkha, 
Economic Council of the Republic or the local government (Gubsovnarhoz)). In that 
sense, the majority of the trusts were subordinated to Vesenkha. 
Moreover, industrial management of trusts was done through a Board of Directors 
appointed by Vesenkha. Furthermore, the Board choose the different managers for each 
factory of the trust and those managers’ aim was to define and structure the internal 
management of each factory. Furthermore, considering management from the worker’s 
point of view, union representatives, managers and party secretaries supervised 
production and tried to increase productivity. 
Howbeit, it is important to remark that trusts were not private enterprises. Trusts could 
sign independent contracts, as part of the decentralization measures that were taking 
place during the NEP. However, trusts could not sign those contracts as owners of the 
property but as trustees of the State, which had, by law, preference against other agents 
as far as trade conditions were equal. Furthermore, the State could not acquire any 
property or products used by trusts unless it was through contractual agreement. 
In fact, according to Bandera, V.N (1963) the industrial structure through ownership can 
be divided in 3 main types of owners in the USSR during the NEP. Those were, Private 
and concessionary (foreign enterprises investing in the Soviet Union in the form of a 
concession), State and cooperatives. Moreover, classified by ownership, industrial 
output during the NEP can be presented as in Table 4.1. 
Essentially, industrial output was dominated by the state firms (in which trusts can be 
included and were normally large-scale industrial enterprises) and along the period, 
industry owned by the state gained more importance relatively in the industrial output. 
However, it is remarkable that the majority of the State industry was not managed 
directly by the State. In that sense, trusts and non-state managed enterprises generated 
the most part of Soviet output during the NEP period. In fact, according to Dobb, M. 
(1946) “By the summer of 1923 there were 478 trusts chartered by Vesenkha, embracing 3651 
enterprises with about a million workers, or some 75 per cent. of all the workers employed in nationalized 
industry”. In that sense, it is clear that management of enterprises was generally 
decentralized during the NEP. 
Gross industrial output according to the type of ownership 
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Table 4.1. Source: Bandera, V. N. (1963). The New Economic Policy (NEP) as an economic 
system. Journal of Political Economy, 71(3), 265-279. 
Regarding internal trade in the USSR during the NEP, a private figure had major 
relevance in order to explain trading in the Soviet Union. The Nepmens, were 
businesspeople that took advantage of the allowance to privately own small-scale 
industry and to trade in a market. Furthermore,  In that sense, as Bean, J. (1997) “By 1926, 
the private sector handled 75 percent of retail trade” adding also that “Nepmen industrialists 
produced one-third of all consumer goods and played an important role in the service sector by opening 
restaurants, inns and publishing houses”. 
Nonetheless, it is remarkable that state enterprises had various advantages in order to 
compete with the Nepmens. In fact, lower taxes and financial backing of the government 
were some of the advantages that state enterprises held against the Nepmens. In spite 
of all those disadvantages, the Nepmens were able to compete successfully essentially 
during the first years of the NEP. In that sense, by the years 1927 to 1928, Nepmen had 
a reduced 22 percent of retail trade and by 1929, Nepmens disappeared with the 
introduction of the First Five Year Plan (1928 – 1932). Finally, the reasons for the 
disappearance of the Nepmens can be classified in two categories: First, politically, the 
existence of Nepmens was not consistent with Marxist theory and, therefore, Nepmens 
should be expelled from the system, according to most Bolsheviks. Secondly, many 
Nepmens prospered through their business and were seen by many as new capitalists 
(which indeed they were) that were perverting the soviet system. 
Finally, it is important to consider how agriculture was organized during the NEP period. 
In fact, economic organization of the agricultural sector was totally different from the 
industrial organization (which has been presented previously). Hence, agricultural 
output was dominated by private production, as according to Bandera, V. N. (1963) 
“Thus, in 1925- 26, 87.8 per cent of the total value of agricultural output was produced privately, 11.4 per 
cent by the state farms, and 0.8 per cent by co-operatives. Control figures for 1926-27 increased the ab- 
solute totals for all three categories, but retained their proportion”. However, private farms were 
generally small/middle-scale farms as the distribution of land was made in the first years 
of the NEP. The results of that land distribution are defined by Allen, R. C. (2003) as “[…] 
a radical equalization of properties as large farms were divided and small holdings enlarged”. 
Moreover, this organization of the agrarian sector leaded to the creation of a new social 
class, the so called kulaks. Those were rich peasants that already existed during the late 
years of the Russian Empire and that prospered again with the introduction of market 
mechanisms in the soviet economy. Politically, the prosperity of kulaks was seen by 
many Bolsheviks as representative of a development of capitalistic dynamics and social 
stratification7. 
                                                          
7 Ladejinsky, W. (1934) and Richman, S. L. (1981). 
 19 
 
In conclusion, the economic structure of the Soviet Union with the implementation of 
the NEP policies can be summarized as follows: The State owned almost all industrial 
enterprises, although the majority of industrial production was not directly managed by 
the State itself or any institution dependant on the State. As for private sector, it was 
relegated to a marginal weight in the total industrial production. Furthermore, private 
enterprises were essentially small-scale ones, while the State owned large-scale 
industrial enterprises. In the agricultural sector, it was the other way around, production 
was dominated by the private sector and state presence in the sector was not dominant. 
Nonetheless, large-scale farms were generally owned by the State and small-scale ones 
were private. Finally, a trade figure (Nepmen) surged by which an important weight of 
trade in the USSR went through during the NEP years. 
 
4.2.3 Prices and monetary reform 
 
After the end of War communism and the introduction of market mechanisms lead to a 
situation in which price controls generally ended. However, in some cases price controls 
persisted, as in some industrial goods and the grain market. In this last case, industry 
and urban areas needed grain prices to be lower in order to be able to consume them. 
Therefore, it can be said that markets implemented during the NEP worked generally 
without state intervention (understood as price controls and requisitions), although 
some concrete markets were still regulated. Furthermore, a process of hyperinflation 
was taking place in the Russian SFSR lead by product scarcity and an imbalanced 
government budget leading to an over expansion of the monetary supply to finance it. 
At 1922, the Bolsheviks decided to introduce a complete change in their fiscal policies, 
as Efremov, S. M. (2012) emphasises “They [referring to the Bolsheviks] resolved to balance 
the budget and issue a new currency, known as the chervonets that would be based on the gold standard”. 
In that sense, from 1922 to 1923, existed in the USSR two currencies: the sovznaki and 
the chervonets. The first currency was abundant in the market and had an extremely low 
value while the chervonets were based on the gold standard and were scarcely supplied 
and highly demanded. With those measures, the Soviets were able to gain enough 
credibility to hold a stable currency (chervonets) for their new market economy and 
control inflation. 
 
4.3 Economic results of the NEP 
 
4.3.1 The Scissors Crisis and hyperinflation (1921 – 1923) 
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The scissors crisis was a phenomenon that appeared during the first years of the NEP 
(1922 – 1923). It can be presented as the first outcome of the New Economic Plan (1922 
– 1928) although as the attentive reader may imagine, NEP policies were not the only 
cause of the Scissors Crisis. That crisis can be divided in two different periods. 
After the Civil War, the famine of 1921 the Russian SFSR was immersed in an important 
inflationary pressure, market mechanisms implementation, as has been explained 
previously, and shortage of raw materials. In that context, at the beginning of 1922 an 
important price differentiation appeared between agricultural and industrial prices. The 
reasons for that were two: Firstly, no marketing apparatus (understood as selling and 
contract infrastructures) existed to sell industrial output and exchange it for raw 
materials. Thus, in order to sell their output buy the needed inputs to continue 
producing, trusts followed a strategy that Dobb, M. (1946) explains as follows “To secure 
the means they lacked for continuing production, the trusts opened small shops or set up stalls in the 
streets in the locality of the factories, or employed itinerant pedlars to barter their products directly with 
the peasants in the village for materials and food”. Secondly, and probably more importantly, 
agricultural output had lowered to self-subsistence levels for the peasantry. Finally, it is 
also remarkable that the introduction of the agricultural tax that substituted the 
requisitioning system lead to a reduction of the incentives for peasants to sell their 
products in the market since peasant’s production was already reduced by the tax. Thus, 
agricultural marketing, which can be defined as agricultural net sales to the rest of the 
economy, fell sharply. All in all, prices for agricultural products rose compared to 
industrial prices as Table 4.2. shows for 1922: 
Terms of Trade during 1922 
Month Year Prices 
Agriculture Industry 
- 1913 100 100 
January 1922 104 92 
February 1922 105 90 
March 1922 109 82 
April 1922 111 77 
May 1922 113 74 
June 1922 106 89 
July 1922 104 92 
August 1922 100,5 99 
September 1922 94 112 
Table 4.2. Source: Dobb, M. (1946). Soviet economic development since 1917. London. 
Nonetheless, this situation of agricultural advantageous terms of trade did not last for 
long. At the end of 1923, the terms of trade were in favour of manufactured products 
by a ratio of 3 to 1 according to Dobb, M (1946).  
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This drastic change in the terms of trade can be explained by the difference in the 
recovery of industrial and agricultural output. Agricultural output recovered faster from 
the famine of 1921 and the Civil war than industrial output. Hence, once marketing 
apparatus were implemented, agricultural output started its recovery as well as 
agricultural marketing, agricultural prices fell relatively to industrial prices as the 
previous Figure 4.1. shows. Last but not least, price controls on agricultural products had 
an important influence in the terms of trade evolution in favour of industry at the end 
of 1922. 
Agricultural Terms of Trade, 1913 – 1927/28 
 
Figure 4.1. Source: Allen, R. C. (2003). Farm to factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet 
industrial revolution. Princeton University Press. 
In fact, Figure 4.1. represents the relation of agricultural and industrial prices during the 
NEP period in three different ways: Retail and wholesale series represents the retail and 
wholesale price relations respectively. Finally, transaction series represents the ratio 
between wholesale agricultural prices and retail prices for non-food manufactured 
goods. 
In conclusion, at this point of the analysis it is relevant to remark that the causes of this 
phenomenon can be classified in two different classes: Firstly, there were circunstacial 
factors like self-subsistance production of agricultural products during the 1922 or the 
famine of 1921 or the lack of raw materials which partially provoked such important 
fluctuations in terms of trade. Secondly, there were a sistemic factors that influenced 
this situation which were the lack of marketing apparatus and the introduction of the 
agricultural tax that substituted the requsitioning system.  
Although, probably sistemic factors were not the most explicative of the Scissors Crisis8 
they are the most important ones in the analysis of this work. In that sense, it is 
                                                          
8 See Dobb, M. (1946). 
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important to highlight that the marketing apparatus introduction problem can be 
extrapolated to every change in the economic system. For instance, it is reasonable to 
believe that if changing from war communism to a market system generates temporary 
distrotions, a change from a market system to a planned economy would also lead to 
temporary distrotions. However, taking into account everything said before, it can be 
said that the difficulties in the introduction of marketing apparatus had not a devastating 
impact in the Soviet economy, although they had some neggative impact on it. 
 
4.3.2 National Income evolution 
 
The evolution of the National Income in the Soviet Union during the NEP period has been 
scarcely analysed. Nonetheless, a rigorous analysis of this data is of major importance in 
the scope of this work. 
In order to start the analysis, it is important to consider and take into account some 
elements that may distort the data. In this sense, it will be considered as the most 
representative data is that one valued with 1913 market prices (data from Markevich, 
A., & Harrison, M. (2011), Gosplan and TsSu). That data can be understood as ideal due 
to several factors: Firstly, because economic structure in 1913 and in 1928 (the year in 
which the NEP finalized) changed at almost no level as Markevich, A., & Harrison, M. 
(2011) point out. In that sense, it can be said that by using prices of 1913 the 
Greschenkron effect is avoided at its greatest part as no important change in economic 
structure can be observed in the former USSR between 1913 and 1928. Furthermore, in 
1913, the Russian Empire had a relatively open and free market economy which was not 
exactly the case for the year 1928 as there were some price controls and state 
monopolies as has already been analysed in this document. 
Moreover, the national income will be compared to 1913 as the base year. That is the 
case as it has been considered that a way to consider the success or failure of the NEP 
in terms of national income is to compare it to the pre-war levels. Nevertheless, as will 
be commented later on, this comparison may not be ideal as some bias has been 
identified. 
Taking into account everything said before, Figure 4.2. presents different series of the 
evolution of soviet national income during the New Economic Plan period. 
National Income evolution during the NEP period 
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Figure 4.2. Sources: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version and Markevich, A., & Harrison, M. (2011). Great War, 
Civil War, and recovery: Russia's national income, 1913 to 1928. The Journal of Economic 
History, 71(03), 672-703.  
In the previous figure, it could be observed that data generally suggests that the NEP 
policies indeed allowed the Soviet economy to recover pre-war income levels by the end 
of that period (1928). Data from the Gosplan (State Planning Committee) and the TsSU 
(Central Statistical Directorate) even suggest that by the end of the NEP, the USSR 
achieved levels of income far superior (111% and 119% respectively) than those in 1913. 
Moreover, both Gosplan and TsSu data were measured at 1913 prices which, as has 
been commented previously, can be identified as ideal. However, this data has been 
criticised by some scholars9. Nonetheless, the recently published data from Markevich, 
A., & Harrison, M. (2011) suggests that for 1928, soviet national income was slightly 
superior to the 1913’s one (109.6% of 1913’s national income). In that sense, only data 
from The Maddison-Project indicates a lower income (96.9%) in 1928 than in 1913. 
However, it should be emphasised that 1913 was abnormally prosperous as, according 
to Mark Harrison in Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994): “The net 
harvest of food grains in 1913 was 17 per cent above the logarithmic trend for 1885-1913”. Hence, an 
outstanding harvest took place in 1913 and so, that fact can present a downward bias in 
the comparison between pre-war (1913) Russian and national income in the NEP period. 
Therefore, it can be said that the NEP period facilitated an economic recovery from the 
Civil war leading to a year on year growth rate that is presented in Table 4.3.  
                                                          
9 See Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). 
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Soviet National Income year on year growth rates during the NEP 
Year National income growth rate 
1922/23 15.3% 
1923/24 26.6% 
1924/25 24.9% 
1925/26 12.3% 
1926/27 4.1% 
1927/28 5.2% 
Table 4.3. Source: Markevich, A., & Harrison, M. (2011). Great War, Civil War, and 
recovery: Russia's national income, 1913 to 1928. The Journal of Economic History, 
71(03), 672-703. 
Taking into account everything said before, in order to provide a complete comparative 
assessment of the economic results of the NEP, it has been elaborated a comparison of 
the evolution of different economies after the First World War (UK, Austria, Germany, 
Hungary, Belgium and France). In that sense, all those countries participated actively in 
the First World War and are geographically close to Russia (all countries are European). 
It must be pointed out, however, that none of those countries suffered from a Civil war 
after the world war and so, it must be taken into account that the years in which 
countries were involved in war were 4 (1914 - 18) while Russia was at war during 7 years 
(1914 – 21). With this analysis, it can be observed that by 1927, all countries (except 
Russia (1930 according to The Maddison-Project and 1928 according to Markevich, A., 
& Harrison, M. (2011)) recovered their pre-war levels of national income. However, the 
impact of the war period was far superior in Russia (1st World War and Civil war) than in 
any other country. As a matter of fact, Russia lost by 1922 (once the Civil war was over 
and the NEP policies just started to be implemented) almost 60% (56.8%) of their income 
in 1913 while Germany (8.69%), Austria (16.97%) and the United Kingdom (5.76%) had 
much minor losses in this regard. Furthermore, France and Belgium registered already 
higher levels of income by 1922 than those in 1913 (103.60% and 104.60% respectively). 
National income comparison for recovery after the 1st World War period 
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Figure 4.3. Source: Own elaboration with data from The Maddison-Project, 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version. 
Therefore, once an international comparison is made, NEP’s results can still be 
considered successful as provided a comparatively fast economic recovery to 7 years of 
war destruction and social changes. However, this success must be qualified as the NEP 
may have been able to restore the national income level, but did it provoked a structural 
change in the pre-war agrarian Russian economy? This qualification and the analysis of 
NEP’s results by sectors is analysed in the following chapters. 
 
4.3.3 Industry 
 
In order to get a deeper analysis on the results of the NEP, a sectorial study of the NEP 
period is compulsory. Regarding the industrial sector, economic results can be classified 
in two types of industry (as was done in the 5th Planovoe khozyastvo or 5th economic 
plan which was elaborated by the Gosplan): Large-scale industry and Small-scale 
industry. Furthermore, as has been commented in previous chapters10 the major part of 
Large-scale industries were owned generally by the State, although the majority of them 
were managed by independent Board of directors (trusts) while Small-scale industry was 
generally owned by private owners. 
Industrial contribution to national income of Russia and the USSR: millions of rubles 
at 1913 market prices 
 
Figure 4.4. Source: Markevich, A., & Harrison, M. (2011). Great War, Civil War, and 
recovery: Russia's national income, 1913 to 1928. The Journal of Economic History, 
71(03), 672-703. 
                                                          
10 See 4.2.2 Economic organization section. 
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Several aspects stand out from Figure 4.4.: Firstly, the economic value of output 
produced by the industrial sector in the USSR during 1928 had already recovered 1913 
level and slightly over performed it. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that a structural 
change occurred neither in the distribution of national income inside the industrial 
sector (large or small – scale industry) nor in the total weight of industry (small and large 
- scale) over national income. 
Concretely, some capital goods industries (like coal and oil industries) reached in 
1926/27 a greater production than the one in 1913. However, iron and steel industries 
which almost disappeared in the war period still lagged behind their 1913 respective 
levels. Generally speaking, as Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) 
point out, “Contrary to expectations, and to the assumptions of many historians, the consumer goods 
industries as a whole lagged behind the capital goods industries”.  Hence, apart from a difference 
in recovery between large and small-scale industries, it can be said that capital goods 
industries and consumer goods industries also presented different rates of growth 
during the NEP.  
From the point of view of the differences between consumer goods and capital goods 
industries, several reasons can be presented to explain that difference in results. 
Resulting from the low agricultural marketing explained by the War communism period 
and the destruction of agricultural output, a shortage in raw materials stroke consumer 
goods industries especially during the early years of the NEP.  
Regarding the large and small scale industries, their evolution was different although 
both industries recovered their pre-war levels. Essentially, large-scale industry 
presented much higher rates of growth than small-scale industry during the NEP period. 
This difference in economic results of large and small scale industries shows the success 
of the trusts system as the fall of large-scale industry compared to the fall of small-scale 
industry during the War communism period was notably larger. 
In conclusion, regarding the industrial sector it can be said that the NEP enabled the 
soviet economy to recover pre-war levels of industrial output. However, no process of 
structural economic change in the Soviet Union was enhanced as the weight of industry 
over the economy was the same in 1913 than in 1928. 
 
4.3.4 Agriculture 
 
The evolution of the agricultural sector during the NEP was similar to the one of the 
industrial sector. In that sense, agriculture reached its net national income contribution 
of 1913 by 192611 although agricultural marketing did not recovered its pre-war level as 
                                                          
11 See Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). 
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Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) point out “According to Gosplan 
estimates, marketed production in 1926/27 amounted to only 17 per cent of gross production, as 
compared with 22-5 per cent in 1913”. Thus, although policies were introduced during the NEP 
to increase agricultural marketing, as the introduction of the tax in kind on agricultural 
products, it failed to encourage enough agricultural marketing to recover its consumer 
goods industries to pre-war levels. Furthermore, price controls on markets like the grain 
market in order to lower raw material prices also influenced the lack of agricultural 
marketing as it reduced incentives to sell agricultural products in the market. 
As Figure 4.5. shows, during the first years of the NEP (from 1922 to 1925) agricultural 
output grew at impressive rates. However, from 1926 agricultural expansion was limited 
to a lower rate of growth. This reduction of agricultural output growth can be explained 
by the lack of technological change in farming production. Moreover, focusing in 
concrete agricultural products, industrial corps, potatoes, fruit and vegetables were 
produced in larger quantities by 1928 than in 1913. 
Nevertheless, some technical change with the introduction of metal plough and horse-
drawn implements. Nonetheless, at the edge of the First Five Year Plan introduction, the 
majority of farming production was non-mechanised leading to no major structural 
change in farming production. In fact, this lack of technological change can be 
demonstrated by the rate of population living in the countryside, which was about four-
fifths of the total population, a slightly lower ratio than the one on the pre-war years (in 
1914, a 17.5 per cent of the population lived in urban areas according to Davies, R. W., 
Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994)). 
Agricultural contribution to Russian and USSR national income: 100 = 1913 in 1913 
market prices 
 
Figure 4.5. Source: Markevich, A., & Harrison, M. (2011). Great War, Civil War, and 
recovery: Russia's national income, 1913 to 1928. The Journal of Economic History, 
71(03), 672-703. 
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Taking everything said before into account and similarly to what happened with 
industry, agriculture did recover from its utterly devastated production (in 1921 
agricultural output was just a 45% of the one in 1913). However, no major improves in 
agricultural productivity (compared to the pre-war levels) occurred during the NEP. 
Hence, it can be said that the NEP was once again successful in recovery but unable to 
produce structural changes. 
 
4.3.5 Foreign trade 
 
As has been explained previously 12  foreign trade during the NEP period was 
monopolized by the Commissariat for Foreign Trade using plans for imports and exports. 
Under this situation, foreign trade recovered from the Civil War, although as Davies, R. 
W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) highlight “[…] it proved particularly difficult to 
rebuild or replace structures and economic mechanisms which had been destroyed, and to reestablish 
confidence.”. Proving those lines, by 1927/28, Soviet Union’s exports were only about 40% 
of the 1913 level although some initiatives were introduced by the government to 
improve exports. In fact, during the NEP period, the government sharply increased 
exports on precious metals and agricultural products. However, as has been previously 
commented agricultural marketing did not fully recovered and with it, the main exports 
source for the Soviet Union had almost disappeared. As a result, trade deficits were 
generalized during all the NEP period. Nonetheless, the government tried to reduce its 
foreign deficits by importing less consumer goods which were generally consumed by 
the old nobleness which had either emigrated or impoverished notably. 
Exports and imports in the Soviet Union (1913 = 100) 
 
Table 4.4. Source: Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). The economic 
transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945. Cambridge University Press. 
                                                          
12 See page 15. 
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As Table 4.4. shows, during the NEP exports did not recover even half of their value in 
1913 whilst imports reached more than 70% of its value in the base year. Therefore, it 
can be said that the NEP was unable to boost foreign trade as it did with agriculture and 
industry. 
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V. THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN (1928 - 1932) 
 
The First Five Year Plan (1928 – 1932) was the first of the thirteen plans that were 
executed during the plan era in the Soviet Union (1928 – 1991). The First Five Year plan 
was not, ironically, the first as many other plans were made by the Gosplan13 (Central 
Economic Planning Agency) during the NEP. Nonetheless, during the NEP period, plans 
made by the Gosplan were only perspectives of development for the following years. In 
fact, the First Five Year Plan was based on those perspectives of development 
elaborated by the Gosplan during the NEP.  
In that sense, the First Five Year Plan represented, from Wheatcroft, S. G., Davies, R. W., 
& Cooper, J. M. (1986) perspective “[...] the first attempt at comprehensive state planning of a 
major economy, is an important if controversial turning-point in the history of world industrialization.”.  
Concerning the contents of this chapter, it is firstly developed the reasoning behind such 
a determining change in the economic policy and organization of the Soviet Union that 
supposed the substitution of the NEP system for the First Five Year Plan. Furthermore 
priorities, debates, development strategies and economic functioning during the years 
of the First Five Year Plan are described and analysed in depth in the second part of the 
chapter. Finally, the last part of the chapter is devoted to the assessment of the 
economic outcomes resulting from the period analysed in this chapter. 
 
5.1 Motivations for the policy change 
 
5.1.1 Rates of growth during the late NEP 
 
Until 1926/27, the soviet economy was generally considered to be recovering its pre-
war levels, as Dobb, M (1946) describes it “The year 1926/7 had been designated as the first 
complete year of the so called “reconstruction period”, when restoring the production on the basis of 
existing capital equipment had been completed”. Furthermore, Lenin’s death in 1924 did not 
just provoke the disappearance of the inventor of the NEP and the undisputed leader of 
the Soviet Union but also the progressive disappearance of the main supporters of the 
mixed economy program. Taking into account the previously presented background, 
data presented from 1926/27 onwards did nothing but to support the detractors of the 
NEP and the general believe that it was the time to implement a true planned socialist 
economy. In that sense, national income growth in 1926/27 and 1927/28 experienced a 
substantial reduction. Precisely, national income growth slowed down from a 24.9% in 
1924/25 to a 4.1% in 1926/27 as Table 4.3. shows. All in all, a clear slowdown of the 
                                                          
13 Like the 5th Planovoe khozyastvo mentioned in page 24. 
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national income occurred after reaching the pre-war economic capacity, which seems 
logical and coherent as part of a process of economic recovery. However, it represented 
a clear change in the trend for economic growth in the Soviet Union, which ultimately 
represented the end of the NEP. In that sense, it was considered by many Bolsheviks 
(including Lenin) that the NEP was a temporary policy as many authors point out14 and 
so, the slowdown in growth rates was the signal to change the economic policy. 
 
5.1.2 The industrialization debate 
 
Following the slowdown of national income and the end of the so called reconstruction 
period, some issues remained to be solved. In that sense, as has been previously 
presented, from the Bolshevik’s perspective, the need to industrialize the country was 
unavoidable. Hence as Joseph Stalin pointed out in a speech in 1931 “We are fifty or a 
hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we 
do it, or they will crush us.”. However, how to proceed with the industrialization of the 
country? Was rapid industrialization possible? Regarding those questions, there were 
two clear positions which can be represented by prominent people of the Communist 
party. On one side, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, member of the Central committee of the 
Communist Party argued that rapid industrialization and thus, rapid capital 
accumulation or primitive socialist accumulation, as Preobrazhensky called it, was 
possible without sacrifices in the consumer side of the economy. From his perspective, 
the emphasis of the industrialization process had to be in the promotion of heavy 
industry. Thus, Preobrazhensky was the first of the so called superindustrializers 
according to Allen, R. C. (2003). Nonetheless, rapid industrialization, as has been 
presented before, needed of a process of primitive socialist accumulation of capital. On 
that, Preobrazhensky proposed the acquisition of wealth from the peasants in order to 
finance the accumulation of socialized capital. Furthermore, to do so, direct taxation as 
in the NEP period was not considered optimal and Preobrazhensky proposed a pricing 
policy to artificially reduce the price of agricultural products in order to extract the 
agricultural surplus and pay for the investment. 
Regarding the primitive socialist accumulation, some remarks can be done. In that sense, 
it should be said that when referring to primitive socialist accumulation, it is being 
pointed out the necessity to finance the initial investment processes through pre-
accumulated capital after the introduction of a new socio-economic system such as 
socialism. In fact, Marx, K. (1867) defined primitive capital accumulation as the process 
in which peasants proprietors were disposed of their land and livestock that were then 
                                                          
14 Bean, J. J. (1997), Richman, S. L. (1981), Allen R. C (2003) and Dobb, M (1946). 
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owned by their feudal lords, leading to a transformation of the lords into capitalists and 
peasants into salaried employees. 
On the other hand, Nikolai Bukharin General secretary of the Comintern and leader of 
the Right opposition, stated that the speed of industrialization was directly related with 
the speed of agricultural output growth. In that sense, it was compulsory, according to 
Bukharin, to promote a balanced growth between agriculture and industry. Regarding 
the pricing policy proposed by Preobrazhensky, Bukharin argued that such a policy 
would reduce notably the so problematic agricultural marketing since the terms of trade 
in the soviet economy would be in favour of the industrial products and hence, the 
reverse policy should be applied leading to lower prices for manufactured goods in order 
to easily improve agricultural marketing and output. 
In conclusion, industrialization was a high priority in the political agenda of the Soviet 
Union at the end of the 1920’s. However, the way in which this process had to be done 
was under discussion, until the introduction of the First Five Year Plan, when Stalin’s 
policies defined a clear strategy for the process. 
 
5.2 Structure and functioning of the First Five Year Plan 
 
5.2.1 Preferences and industrialization in a planned economy 
 
Before starting with the proper analysis of the First Five Year Plan, it may be illustrative 
to define some of the most prominent debates on economic planning. Furthermore, it 
is relevant to describe the main functioning differences between market economies and 
planned economies. Among those debates, it can be remarked the preferences debate 
referring to the dichotomy between the planners’ preferences and those of the 
consumers. 
In that sense, it is straight forward to assume that in a planned economy, the economy 
is developed through the planners’ preferences. Moreover, some scholars claim that it 
could happen that planners’ preferences differed from those of the consumers. In fact, 
it is straightforward to the attentive reader to identify the planners’ preferences with 
the increase of its power. Therefore, investment goods and military equipment instead 
of consumer goods may be the major priority for planners. Thus, the presented view 
would lead to a low or null increase in the standards of living in a planned economy 
where the planners’ preferences dominated. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that 
in a market economy, future consumption depends on the level of investment which is 
determined by the rate of time preference of potential savers as the economic orthodox 
theory postulates. However, as Allen, R. C. (2003) outlines “While this theories usually abstract 
from the distribution of income, it is important for the discussion at hand that most savings is, in fact, 
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done only by the well-to-do. In that case, the preferences of the overwhelming majority are irrelevant.”. 
Moreover, the previous point is still more relevant in such an unequal and low income 
economy as the tsarist one. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the majority of the 
population would prefer a higher savings rate than the one rich people wanted. Thus, 
planners’ preferences do not differ from those of the consumers systematically, as there 
may be cases in which the majority of consumers’ preferences coincide with those of 
the planners.  
Furthermore, it is important to consider that even assuming that the planners’ 
preferences do not coincide with those of the consumers in a country without 
democratic control mechanisms as the Soviet Union, a planned economy presents a 
clear advantage for an industrialization process with respect to a market economy. 
Taking it from the previous statement, a planned economy is able to coordinate its 
investment efforts to provide a self-sufficient economic push through the 
industrialization of a country as Allen, R. C. (2003) underlines. On the other side, a 
market economy has different dynamics regarding investment. In that sense, in a market 
economy investment is done generally through uncoordinated15 individual decisions 
which may lead to a situation in which the economy is trapped in a low income 
equilibrium. It is especially illustrative of this situation the famous model developed by 
Robert Solow and the poverty traps reasoning16. 
Hence, there is a wide variety of debates and views regarding the optimality of a planned 
economy in a process of rapid industrialization as the one that engaged the Soviet Union 
during the 1930s. 
 
5.2.2 Functioning and organization of the Soviet planned economy 
 
Regarding the functioning of the planned economy that emerged from the introduction 
of the First Five Year Plan, some remarks should be done in order to differentiate the 
NEP from the planned system. During the development of the soviet five year plans, the 
surplus was produced in state enterprises and then appropriated and distributed by 
state entities such as the Veshenka. To do so, the state had shops and bazaars in order 
to, in principle17, allow citizens to buy the consumption products they wanted. In that 
sense, as Fitzpatrick, S. (1999) outlines “With the outlawing of private enterprises at the end of 
the 1920s, the state became the main and often the only legal distributor of goods. All large social goods 
like housing, medical care, higher education, and vacations were distributed by state agencies”. 
Nonetheless, for consumer goods such as food and clothing, the state was not the only 
                                                          
15 Here, uncoordinated is referred to the fact that investment is not directed and organized but responds to other 
factors such as individual incentives. 
16 For more information, see Kraay, A., & Raddatz, C. (2007). Poverty traps, aid, and growth. Journal of Development 
Economics, 82(2), 315-347. 
17 This freedom of choice did not occurred during the rationing years as is explained later in this chapter. 
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supplier as in May 1932 peasantry was allowed to sell products of this kind in Kholkhoz18 
markets. 
Furthermore, between 1928 and 1935, hence during the first and second five year plans, 
a rationing system was implemented. This system was not introduced by any 
government neither the national nor those of each soviet republic. In that sense, 
municipal and local governments individually implemented rationing for certain 
commodities leading to an almost universal rationed distribution system in 1931 
according to Chossudowsky, E. M. (1941). However, not all goods were rationed as 
cultural articles and luxury goods remained without rationing. Hence, with this situation, 
it was not until 1931 when rations became standardized and classifications among 
different workers were made (the most privileged were those working in heavy 
industry). Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the rationing system was temporary 
and its reasoning was purely circumstantial and not systemic. 
Essentially, the introduction of the rationing system was justified for the exceptionality 
of the industrialization process and the presumably incapacity of the soviet economy to 
initially sustain an important industrialization process. In that sense, consumers were 
“forced” to consume less in order to have a greater investment in the industrial sector. 
The policy of investment and consumers’ preferences will be analysed later on in the 
following sections of this work. 
Finally, the relations between the state and the peasantry were regulated by a system 
of delivery quotas. The Otovarivanie was a system in which contractual obligations 
between the agricultural sector and the state were established similarly to a barter 
system in which the peasants had to provide certain amount of their production, and 
depending on that amount, the government had to supply those peasants with a 
proportional amount of consumption goods according to the state fixed prices. Hence, 
according to Allen, R.C. (1998) “Starting in 1930, […] the state imposed substantial delivery quotas 
on each farm and paid relatively low prices for this produce.” and so “The Soviet state financed its 
investment program with this revenues”. Thus, a process of primitive socialist accumulation at 
the Preobrazhensky’s way took place in the Soviet Union during the First Five Year Plan 
period. 
 
5.2.3 Elaboration and reasoning under the First Five Year Plan 
 
Initially, plans elaborated by the Gosplan were just perspective plans (hence had no 
direct application in the economy) and were thought to cover five years. However, as 
                                                          
18 See page 36 for a definition of kholkhoz. 
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Dobb, M (1946) remarks “The need for a perspective of development over an even longer period of 
10 or 15 years was urged by some, and a draft of “a general plan for 15 years” was actually prepared”.  
Nonetheless, those general plans for 15 years were too general and imprecise to provide 
the soviets with a useful guideline, as too many variable and external factors distorted 
the economy for such a long period of time. 
Furthermore, by 1927, the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (Vesenkha) had 
already elaborated a draft of the First Five Year Plan for industry which gave much more 
importance to heavy industry than the previous proposals. In that sense, there was a 
debate regarding the possibility that the first perspective plan made by the Gosplan 
underestimated the rates at which soviet industry could be developed. However, 
Gosplan economists based their perspective plan on the idea that major industrial 
growth had to be the main goal of the plan, but it had to be sustained by an important 
expansion of agricultural output and agricultural marketing. On the other hand, 
Vesenkha’s plan was based on the idea that a great expansion of industrial output, which 
was also the principal aim of the plan, could be achieved without translating the growth 
dynamics of the industrial sector on the agrarian sector. 
In 1928, a final form for the Five Year Plan was adopted by the Gosplan which was 
presented as Dobb, M (1946) explains: 
“This [referring to the First Five Year Plan made by the Gosplan in 1928] was drawn up in 
two variants: the one an “initial” or “minimum variant”, resting on a cautious estimate of a number of 
uncertain factors in the situation; the other, the “optimal” or “maximum variant”, built upon more 
optimistic assumptions. It was the latter that was finally approved in the spring of 1929 by the government 
as the definitive First Five Year Plan”. 
Moreover, it is remarkably important to highlight, for a further precise assessment of 
the First Five Year Plan the assumptions under which the definitive version of the plan 
was written according to Dobb, M. (1946): First of all, the Gosplan assumed no major 
failure of the harvest during the plan years as well as a wider expansion of intercourse 
with world economy resulting from an increase in exportable resources available and in 
long-term credits from abroad. Also, it was assumed that there would be a fall on 
national defence expenditure relative to the national income of the Soviet economy. 
Finally, it is important to underline the way calculations and estimations were made in 
the First Five Year Plan: First of all, the goals for investment and production were 
established and from there, costs’ reductions and productivity targets were fixed so as 
to be able to fulfil the production goals. Thus, productivity and costs’ reduction targets 
were calculated as residuals according to Davies, R. W., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1975). 
 
5.2.4 The Investment policy 
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As the First Five Year Plan was being elaborated and implemented, one of the most 
relevant factors was how to determine the allocation and amount of investment.  
Hence, the First Five Year Plan became the beginning and guideline of a major process 
of massive investment in all sectors but with an especial emphasis on the industrial 
sector. In fact, according to Dobb, M (1946) “Annual net investment meanwhile was to increase 
by three times when expressed in the current prices of each year, and by appreciably more when 
expressed in real terms”. In that sense, the following table presents a dimensional idea 
sector by sector to where was investment allocated: 
Fixed Capital Capacity in 1928 and Planned for 1933, at the Beginning of the Year (in 
millions of 1925/26 rubles) 
 
Table 5.1. Source: Hunter, H. (1973). The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan. 
Slavic Review, 32(2), 237-257. 
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even though the investment structure was 
planned to specially focus on the industrial sector, investment was expected to increase 
in all sectors of the economy. Furthermore, focusing on the previously presented 
dichotomy of planner’s versus consumer’s preferences, consumption was to relatively 
fall from a 76% of the annual deliveries of final output in 1927/28 to a 57% in 1932/33. 
However, the plan presented an absolute increase in annual deliveries of final output to 
consumption, which can be extrapolated from what Hunter, H. (1973) underlines in the 
following quote: “The industry and construction sectors were to be expanded far more rapidly than 
the agriculture and housing sectors. The plan called for disproportional growth in sectorial outputs”. In 
that sense, investment and consumption were also planned to grow disproportionally. 
Hence, at least initially, the First Five Year Plan presented a relative trade-off between 
consumption and investment although this trade-off did not mean, at least on paper, 
that as investment increased, consumption had to be reduced in absolute terms19.  
Consumption in the Fel’dman Model 
                                                          
19 However, as has already been remarked, rationing systems were imposed in the Soviet Union between 1928 and 
1935. 
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Figure 5.1. Source: Allen, R. C. (2003). Farm to factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet 
industrial revolution. Princeton University Press. 
In that sense, the plan was coherent with the Fel’dman Model20. Essentially, this model 
made by an economist from the Gosplan which gave its name, divides the economy into 
two sectors (producer and consumer goods). Its main conclusion is that depending on 
the fraction of producer goods output reinvested in the sector (e), consumer goods may 
or not decrease as the previous figure shows. 
 
5.2.5 Agricultural collectivization 
 
During the development of the First Five Year Plan, a massive movement of 
collectivization took place in the agrarian sector. As a matter of fact, some collectivized 
farms were already implemented during the NEP, however, as Ladejinski, W. (1934) 
emphasises “The percentage of farms collectivized [in 1928] was 1.7, representing 1.6 per cent of the 
total population and 1.2 per cent of the total cultivated area.”. Therefore, at the edge of the First 
Five Year Plan, the level of collectivization in the villages can be considered to be 
insignificant. However, by that time, there were up to 3 different types of collectivized 
farms: 
- The Kholkhozs: This kind of collective farm was an agricultural commune. Work, 
consumption and income were all divided equally. Moreover, individual 
                                                          
20 For more information on this model and its mathematical development, look at Allen, R.C. (2003). 
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properties were all collectivized. It was the type of collective farm with the 
highest degree of socialization. 
 
- The Artels: Those entities involved the collectivization of the basic means of 
production and generally presented a complete consolidation of the fields held. 
In those, a part of the income was divided equally, but another part was divided 
according to the property contributed. 
 
- The Tozs: It was an organization in which some of the means of production were 
socialized temporarily. Thus, there was no physical consolidation of land nor an 
equal division of income, as the share of it that each peasant earned depended 
upon the amount of labour and equipment it temporarily provided to the Toz. 
From that point, in 1929 when the “maximum variant” of the First Five Year Plan was 
adopted as the definitive plan version, it presented a deep reorganization of the 
agricultural sector. The aim of the plan regarding the agricultural sector was a 
socialization of the sector. Hence, this process of massive collectivization in the 
agricultural sector was introduced due to several reasons: Firstly, as has been presented 
previously21 , there was a group of important landowners called kulaks which were 
considered as petit-bourgeois. In that sense, as Ladejinski, W. (1934) outlines “The 
economic power of the kulak group was considerably greater than their numbers would seem to indicate. 
They controlled more than one-third of the total means of production in the village, cultivated 23.5 per 
cent of the entire sown area, and produced 40% of the total amount of grain sold on the market.”. From 
the point of view of the majority of the Communist party, the existence of the kulaks 
had to end as soon as possible as it represented the introduction of capitalistic dynamics 
in the agricultural sector. Secondly, the problematic during the 1920’s of the low 
agricultural marketing provided incentives to the collectivization of the countryside in 
order to supply enough raw materials to allow industry to fulfil the First Five Year Plan. 
Finally, as Allen, R. C. (2003) emphasises: “Stalin, however, favored the view that the farm size 
distribution determined the propensity to market. According to this view, extrarural sales were lower in 
the 1920s than they had been before the war primarily because of the elimination of large gentry and 
kulak farms after 1917 and the corresponding expansion of medium-sized, self-sufficient peasant farms.” 
Hence, this reasoning lead to the generalized idea around the party that a reorganization 
orientated to an expansion of the scale of farms in order to avoid economic and 
potentially political troublesome. 
Therefore, in November 1929, it was announced a movement to join collectives and a 
campaign was launched in which government officials tried to make peasants vote for 
the establishment of collective farms. In that sense, the official policy was to make 
peasants form those collective farms voluntarily, although excesses occurred according 
to Allen, R. C (2003). To see the effect of this policy, Table 5.2. is remarkably illustrative. 
                                                          
21 See page 18. 
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The collectivization process during the beginning of 1930 
 
Table 5.2. Source: Ladejinsky, W. (1934). Collectivization of Agriculture in the Soviet 
Union I. Political Science Quarterly, 49(1), 1-43. 
However, it did not take long until this rapid collectivization process experienced some 
slowdown. The reasoning behind it was, essentially, the homogenization of the different 
types of collectives into the Kholkhozs or agricultural commune types. In that sense, for 
many peasants the previously described collectivization process resulted in a 
transformation to the highest form of collectivization overnight. This process lead to 
protests from the peasantry and a campaign for the slaughter of peasants’ cattle, which 
ultimately forced the government to change its mass collectivization policy 22 . In 
conclusion, this protest movement provided the peasantry with a more lax policy of 
collectivization (introduced at the beginning of 1931) that moderated the reduction of 
the collectivization movement and allowed a steadier and stable growth of collective 
farming. All in all, as Ladejinsky, W. (1934) indicates “While in 1930 [at the end of the year] 
the collective farms were responsible for 27.8 per cent and the individual sector for 68.3 per cent of the 
total grain produced, in 1931 the respective positions of these two sectors were practically reversed.”. 
Furthermore, Kukals disappeared as the collectivization process developed and with 
them the majority of the most skilful peasants that forced the government to try to 
correct this shortage of qualified peasants. According to Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & 
Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) “In the early 1930s, the state attempted to fill the gap [referring to this 
lack of skilful peasants] by sending in tens of thousands of urban workers and others to assist in the 
running of the collective farms. But they had been hastily trained, and often lacked all experience of any 
kind of farming.” 
 
5.3 Economic results of the First Five Year Plan 
 
                                                          
22 For more information on this new policy, look at Ladejinsky, W. (1934). Collectivization of Agriculture in the Soviet 
Union II. Political Science Quarterly, 49(2), 207-252. 
. 
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5.3.1 National income evolution and general assessment of the plan results 
 
From the National Income perspective, the Soviet Union experienced a very rapid 
growth by international standards during the period of the First Five Year Plan according 
to western scholars23. Nonetheless, the official data from the TsSU  has been considered 
to be exaggerated by multiple factors: Firstly, 1926/27 was used as base year for the 
calculations, which meant that the Greschenkron effect increased the growth rates of 
capital goods (which were the most rapidly growing component of material production 
according to Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994)). Finally, the hidden 
inflation problem was not tackled by the official data. 
Taking into account everything said before, it is important to consider the following 
table: 
Annual net national income growth as a percentage per year 
 
Table 5.3. Source: Kaser, M. C. (1957). Estimating the Soviet National Income. The 
Economic Journal, 67(265), 83-104. 
For the period of our interest in Table 5.3. (1928 – 1937) annual rates of growth of the 
national income vary substantially. However, several remarks can be done: Firstly, the 
rate of growth considering the mean of the different calculations made by the western 
economists that appear in Table 5.3. is 6.21%. In that sense, it can be said that the soviet 
economy presented an important rate of growth during the first two five year plans 
(from 1928 to 1937). However, if the rate of growth during the First Five Year Plan is the 
only one taken into account, according to data from The Maddison-Project, the per year 
rate of growth was minor to the one achieved in the Second Five Year Plan (2.04%). 
Furthermore, if the evolution soviet national income during the First Five Year Plan is 
contextualized in the international background, the results of the soviet economy can 
be clearly stated. To do so, an international comparison has been done between the 
national income evolutions during the period of the most developed countries at the 
                                                          
23 See Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). 
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beginning of the 20th century and those countries with a similar national income per 
capita to that of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the period. 
In that sense, 8 different countries (Colombia, Brasil, Peru, Honduras, Portugal, Sri 
Lanka, Philippines and Japan) with a GDP per capita in 1927 similar to the one of the 
USSR (1303 (1990 Int. GK$) according to The Maddison Project) have been compared 
with the evolution of the USSR during the First Five Year Plan period. Moreover, 
countries from different geographical areas have been included in order to avoid 
inconsistencies. From that analysis, there was no country that reached the rate of 
growth of the Soviet Union during the period, as Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3 show24.  
In order to present a wider and deeper comparison of the soviet first plan period 
regarding the national income, it has been also compared the per capita income level of 
the most developed countries, among which can be found the USA, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Belgium and Canada. As in the previous comparison, none of those 
countries grew as much as the USSR between 1928 and 1932. Hence, it is clear that even 
though there might be biased data (as the official soviet data), the First Five Year Plan 
provided the soviet economy with a rate of growth that although does not appear to be 
impressive, it is one of the best when it is compared internationally. 
USSR per capita GDP in 1990 Int. GK$ (1920 = 100) 
 
Figure 5.2. Sources: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version 
Regarding the achievement of the goals proposed in the definitive variant of the First 
Five Year Plan, it can be stated that except for transport, the other sectors of the 
                                                          
24 See Annex. 
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economy did not matched its expected results by the end of 1932 according to Hunter, 
H. (1973). Furthermore, it is also remarkable the fact that even though the plan originally 
did not considered a reduction in the general level of consumption at the end, total 
consumption was reduced due to several reasons (which also explain the failure to 
achieve the goals proposed by the first plan): Firstly, all the assumptions made by the 
Gosplan did not hold at the end leading to a reduction of consumption in order to hold 
an important rate of investment. In that case, it is clear that the planner’s preferences 
prevailed over the ones of the consumers. Finally, according to some western scholars25, 
the goals presented at the First Five Year Plan were overambitious and the predicted 
growth unachievable without a reduction of consumption. 
 
5.3.2 Industry 
 
The industrial output was the most dynamic sector in the soviet economy during the 
First Five Year Plan. Highlighting this last statement, Hunter, H. (1973) outlined “Even if 
one rejects the official Soviet series as reflecting improper price weights, it remains clear that industrial 
output expanded markedly, by at least 50 percent over five years and 80 percent over six years, though 
the aggregate target for 1933 was far from met.”. However, as has been pointed out in the 
previous section, this impressive growth in industrial output was not enough to achieve 
the goals presented by the plan.  
Furthermore, reassessing the growth of the industrial sector, several western scholars 
have modified and corrected some biases in the official Soviet data. The results of some 
of those reassessments are shown in Table 5.4. 
Indexes of industrial production for 1928 – 1940 (1928 = 100) 
 
Table 5.4. Source: Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). The economic 
transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945. Cambridge University Press. 
                                                          
25 Hunter, H. (1973) and Davies, R. W., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1975). 
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From Table 5.4. two main assessments can be done in addition to the ones from Hunter, 
H. (1973) pointed out previously: Firstly, not even the most enthusiastic result obtained 
by western scholars (correcting the Greschenkron effect and hidden inflation problems) 
reach the levels of industrial output growth claimed by the Soviet official data. Finally, 
the growth from the First Five Year Plan period (from 1928 to 1932) was much lower to 
the one during the Second Five Year Plan (from 1932 to 1937). This impressive increase 
in the growth rates of industrial output from the first to the second plan can be explained 
by several factors. First of all, the collectivization process was less traumatic (both 
economically, as will be seen once the agricultural results are assessed, and socially) 
during the second plan period, leading to a greater agricultural production that 
increased the amount of raw materials for the industrial sector. Furthermore, the 
investment in capital goods industries made in the first plan lead to a major growth 
capacity for the industrial sector during the second plan. Finally, a certain component of 
learning-by-doing or adjustment can be considered to explain this difference in the 
results. 
GDP growth by sector in the Soviet Economy  
 
Table 5.5. Source: Allen, R. C. (2003). Farm to factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet 
industrial revolution. Princeton University Press. 
Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that a process of structural change in the soviet 
economy was engaged with the First Five Year Plan, as industrial weight over the total 
value of the national income increased during the first plan period according to Allen, R. 
C. (2003). This last statement can be confirmed by the previous table. 
Apart from the growth segmentation between the different types of industries (among 
which machinery and materials have the highest rates of growth for the First Five Year 
Plan period), it is important to remark that industry grew at a markedly faster rate 
(during the whole period) than GDP, leading to an increase in the weight of industrial 
output over the total GDP of the soviet economy. 
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Regarding the productivity in industry, it is relevant to highlight that even though, 
according to Wheatcroft, S. G., Davies, R. W., & Cooper, J. M. (1986) “after the substantial 
investment in industry, labour productivity (output per person-year) increased substantially over the 
period 1928-1941 as a whole”, during the first years of the industrialization process, hence 
during the First Five Year Plan, a mass introduction of industrial workers leading to an 
initial reduction of the productivity in the industrial sector.  
All in all, it can be stated that the industrial sector was the main source of economic 
growth during the First Five Year Plan period. 
 
5.3.3 Agriculture 
 
The agricultural sector can be presented as a sector that did not achieve any impressive 
positive growth. In this regard, it has been remarked by several authors 26  that the 
introduction of the collectivization process at the late 1920’s had disastrous 
consequences on agricultural output. In particular, livestock and dairy products suffered 
the worst decline among all agricultural products, as Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & 
Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) “Between 1928 and 1933 the number of cattle fell by 44 per cent, of pigs 
by 55 per cent, and of sheep and goats by as much as 65 per cent. This decline – except in the case of pigs 
– was far greater than that which had occurred as a result of the six years of world war and civil war 
between 1914 and 1921.”. Nonetheless, there were some exceptions to the general 
decrease of agricultural output during the first plan period such as raw cotton output, 
although those exceptions are scarce.  
Hence, it is illustrative to this last statement the results presented in Table 5.6., which 
show a decrease in total agricultural production in 1933 compared to that in 1928 by 
16.35% which for animal products is even worse leading to a reduction of 52.60% of 
1928 total output.  
Annual gross output of different agricultural products 1928 – 1933 (millions of rubles 
at base period prices)  
Table 5.6. Source: Hunter, H. (1988). Soviet Agriculture with and without 
Collectivization, 1928-1940. Slavic review, 47(2), 203-216. 
                                                          
26 Allen, R. C. (2003) and Davies, R., W. Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). 
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Nevertheless, although the introduction of the collectivization process during this period 
can be considered as one of the main causes for this reduction in agricultural output, it 
was not the only one. In that sense, it can be pointed out that the delivery quotas leading 
the Otovarivanie system was also an influential factor on the reduction of livestock and 
dairy products. Hence, excessively high delivery quotas on grain lead to a shortage of it 
to feed livestock. Furthermore, Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994) 
also outline bad weather conditions as one of the causes of the global decline in 
agricultural output. Finally, the lack of skilful peasants brought about by the suppression 
of the Kulaks and the not fully developed program of agricultural specialists presented 
in the collectivization section27 can be presented as reasons for this output reduction. 
As a result of those shortages in agricultural products, the Soviet Union suffered a 
famine from 1932 to 1933. In that sense, according to Davies, R.W. and Wheatcroft S.G. 
(2016), deaths were estimated to be between 5.5 and 6.5 million people28.  
However, outside the output evolution, the agricultural sector benefited from the 
industrial achievements that have been presented previously in this work. 
Consequently, the mechanisation of the countryside lead to an increase in the number 
of tractors from 2.4 thousand in 1929 to 122.3 thousand in 1933 according to Ladejinsky, 
W. (1934). 
 
5.3.4 Foreign Trade 
 
The foreign trade situation for the Soviet Union during the First Five Year Plan did not 
improve from that of the last years of the NEP, in fact, it even worsened. However, it is 
remarkably important to consider the international trade situation in order to explain 
the evolution of imports and exports of the Soviet Union during the period. 
In that sense, the volume of world trade fell by one quarter between 1929 and 1932 
according to Wheatcroft, S. G., & Davies, R. W. (1985). The consequence of this 
reduction of world trade was the sudden wave of protectionism and falling prices due 
to the Great Depression. Moreover, the grain and primary products in international 
markets suffered an impressive price collapse that lead to an important terms of trade 
decline for those countries that based their export sector in primary products 
exportations, as was the case of the USSR. Hence, the Soviet Union experienced a sharp 
decline in its terms of trade as Figure 5.3. shows. 
                                                          
27 See from page 36 to 38. 
28 For a deeper analysis on the subject see Davies, R., & Wheatcroft, S. (2016). 
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Nonetheless, to deal with this adverse international situation, the Soviet Union had a 
state monopoly for trade as during the NEP29 that allowed the government to have more 
control over the trade situation. In that sense, soviet exports initially increased as a 
result of the government policy to expand exports in order to be able to continue with 
the imports expansion to facilitate the industrialization process. However, the price 
decline in primary products made it impossible for the government to achieve any 
surplus during the first plan. In fact, the Soviet foreign debt more than doubled between 
1929 and 1931 according to Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). 
Soviet Terms of trade evolution during the First Five Year Plan (1913 = 100) 
 
Figure 5.3. Source: Davies, R. W., Harrison, M., & Wheatcroft, S. G. (1994). The economic 
transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945. Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 See page 15. 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present some of the most relevant considerations and ideas 
that can be deduced from the previously presented analysis of the NEP and the First Five 
Year Plan. Furthermore, a comparison between both growth strategies as well as the 
limitations that this work presents will be stated in this chapter.  
First of all, it is important to outline the fact that many differences between the NEP and 
the Five Year Plan can be found. In this sense, differences have been divided into three 
different aspects: The functioning and organization of the two systems, the objectives 
of both strategies and finally, their results. 
Regarding the functioning and the organization of both systems, it is clear that both 
present different dynamics for resource allocation. Hence, the New Economic Policy 
(1921 – 1928) introduced in the Soviet Union a market economy in which the state had 
an important presence in several sectors of the economy. Consequently, the NEP 
transformed the functioning of the Soviet economy from war communism to a state 
capitalism system (or mixed economy). Additionally, it should be stated that this last 
point is extremely relevant in order to corroborate the hypothesis presented in this work 
as the NEP may not be defined as a socialist economy. However, it must be said that an 
important percentage of the industrial sector was socialized (either directly managed by 
the state or owned by the state but managed by relatively independent boards of 
directors (trusts)). Hence, there were sectors in the economy that were socialized, 
although the whole Soviet economy during the NEP cannot be classified as a pure 
socialist economy. 
Concerning the First Five Year Plan (1928 - 1932), market dynamics partially disappeared 
and resource allocations were done through central planning and rationing in some 
cases. Thus, it might be considered that the First Five Year Plan led to a transformation 
of the mixed economy of the NEP into a socialist economy and consequently, there 
appears to be a fundamental differentiation between both growth strategies regarding 
its functioning and organization. 
As for the objectives of both growth strategies, the industrial sector expansion was the 
main goal of the First Five Year Plan30 whilst the NEP had no such preferences (its main 
objective could be defined as the economic recovery from the War communism period).  
Additionally, it can be said that those different objectives came from different contexts 
as for the NEP period, the Russian SFSR just came out of 7 years of war with an extremely 
authoritarian economic system such as war communism (1918 – 1921). In that sense, 
this last growth method was limited by its context to provide any kind of transformation 
                                                          
30 See Dobb, M (1946). 
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in the Soviet economy (as the first plan did) as the NEP adjusted to a demand for less 
state intervention, specially stated by the peasantry as well as to the need to recover 
the economic levels of the pre-war years. Nevertheless, the context may not be the only 
reason for the no economic transformation of the Soviet Union during the NEP. It can 
be stated that a lower state intervention in an economy may lead to a process of 
investment assignment that follows a potential rate of profits logic rather than an 
economic transformation logic per se. 
Concerning the economic results of both growth systems, it is important to assess its 
results comparatively. First of all, it should be pointed out that this work has focused on 
a sectorial analysis of the results of each growth strategy. In that sense, the economic 
analysis of the results could be expanded to other aspects (for instance equality or living 
standards), hence the analysis presented in this work has limited exclusively to the study 
of economic growth and the factors that influenced it. 
Taking into account everything said before, the growth rates presented during the NEP 
period are much higher than those during the First Five Year Plan. However, it is the case 
since the NEP period involved the recovery process, which presented impressive rates 
of growth during the first years of the NEP (until 1926) boosted by the recovery of the 
productive capacity of the economy. Additionally, rates of growth for the last years of 
the NEP (1926 – 1928) are very similar to those obtained during the First Five Year Plan 
period31. Nonetheless, growth during the NEP period can be considered to have been a 
balanced one since both the industrial and agricultural sector grew and recovered its 
pre-war levels. However, the First Five Year Plan presented an unbalanced growth 
among the different sectors of the economy.  
Consequently, the First Five Year Plan was able to start a process of transformation in 
the Soviet economic structure leaded by an intense growth of the industrial sector. In 
that sense it is worth noticing that although the results of the plan did not match the 
expectations 32 , the Soviet economy undoubtedly engaged in an economic 
transformation process, which was at the end, the main goal of the plan. 
However, the First Five Year Plan also presented some results that can be classified as 
failures, such as the collectivization of agriculture. In that sense, it is important to 
highlight the unnecessary nature of this process in order to achieve a successful process 
of industrialization. Consequently, it can be considered that a policy to increase the 
agricultural marketing might have avoided the decline experienced in agricultural 
output during the period and may have allowed the industrial sector to grow at a similar 
rate to the one it actually grew. Alternatively, a collectivization process in which 
peasants could freely decide the type and degree of collectivization could also have 
avoided the decline in agricultural production since no mass slaughter of peasant’s cattle 
                                                          
31 See Table 4.3 and Table 5.3. 
32 See page 41. 
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would have been made. Nonetheless, all those statements should be analysed in other 
works and in more depth to reach a proper conclusion on this topic. All in all, the First 
Five Year Plan can be presented as a partial success since even though not all goals were 
achieved, it started the industrialization process of the USSR. 
On the other side, generally speaking, the New Economic Policy could be classified as a 
successful policy regarding its results. Nevertheless, it also presented some failures 
regarding its results, such as the inability to recover the pre-war exportation levels or 
the price instability of the initial years of the period.  
To conclude, it must be pointed out that distinctions have been found. Moreover, 
further assessments on the way the NEP and the First Five Year Plan functioned and 
introduced economic growth have also been done. In that sense, this work has 
introduced a new perspective on the NEP and the first plan growth strategies since the 
comparison of them has shed light on the establishment of a clear differentiation 
between both growth strategies.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, differences can be found between both growth strategies which embrace 
structural and functional factors, the dynamics and preferences as well as the proper 
results in different sectors. Furthermore, it can be said the first years of the Soviet Union, 
presenting an important variety in the organization and functioning of their economy, 
national income growth never stopped. Hence, strategies to boost economic growth 
(New Economic Policy and the First Five Year Plan) with different ideological and 
economic perspectives can be considered as a success in a low developed country as the 
USSR at the 1920s and 30s. 
Moreover, another important conclusion of this work is the fact that, between 1921 and 
1928, the Soviet economy did not have all sectors of the economy socialized, leading to 
an economy that should not be defined socialist. On the other hand, the Soviet economy 
during the First Five Year Plan presented a totally socialized industrial sector as well as 
an almost completely collectivized agrarian sector leading to a socialized economy. 
Additionally, the economic results obtained in the NEP and the First Five Year Plan both 
presented important growth rates. However, differences between economic sectors 
(especially during the First Five Year Plan) regarding their results can be stated if the 
agricultural, industrial and foreign trade economic sectors are analysed. In that sense, 
different contexts, objectives, organization and functioning of the economy can explain 
these differences in the results of some economic sectors. Consequently, it can be 
pointed out that the main source of growth during the First Five Year Plan was the 
industrial sector, whilst the growth during the New Economic Policy period was far more 
diversified among the different economic sectors. 
Furthermore, this differentiation in economic sector results explains the 
industrialization process occurring in the Soviet Union that started with the introduction 
of the First Five Year Plan (1928 – 1932). Concretely, this industrialization process 
occurred due to the establishment of such a process as the main objective of the first 
plan and the investment assignment policy in a planned economy framework. 
In a nutshell, economic growth can be observed for the two growth strategies analysed 
in this study, however, different growth sources and economic functioning (socialized 
economy or not and planned economy or market economy) differentiate the NEP and 
the First Five Year Plan. 
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IX. ANNEX 
Industrialization levels (UK 1900 = 100) 
Table 8.1 Source: Broadberry, S., & O'Rourke, K. H. (2010). The Cambridge Economic 
History of Modern Europe: Volume 2, 1870 to the Present. Cambridge University Press. 
Russian GDP per capita compared to the one of western European countries and 
Offshoots 
 
Figure 8.1. Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version 
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GDP per capita evolution of low developed countries compared to the USSR (1927 – 
1932) 
 
Figure 8.2. Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version 
GDP per capita evolution of developed countries compared to the USSR (1927 – 1932) 
 
Figure 8.3. Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version 
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